(This material has been adapted from an article originally written for 'On procedure and politics' a blog which focuses on aspects of parliamentary procedure and politics, parliamentary and electoral reform rather than partisan debate and policy analysis, straddling the UK and Canada .

The functioning of our democracy depends in part on the acceptance by the people of the way the electoral system works. While electoral systems may not currently be top of the agenda in the UK , there is no more important issue affecting the ability of a democracy to endure. Democratic politicians get their mandate to govern as the result of an election.

The election result depends, in part, on the electoral system employed. Different systems produce different results which can even lead to a different way of doing politics. Ultimately the overall process must have the approval of the electorate. No political party can be sure of maintaining their hold on power, no electoral system can survive unchanged, if the people come to believe that the way their votes are processed or interpreted is unfair.

DPR Voting has many additional ‘soft' benefits for our political system, and it could prove both a popular, practical, and maybe even a politically acceptable replacement for FPTP. It is frequently said that there is no perfect electoral system. Does DPR Voting have shortcomings as a system, or, as a replacement for FPTP, do the advantages far outweigh any perceived disadvantages?

DPR Voting is certainly interesting, but obviously completely untried. Should we take it seriously?

It is new and untried, and needs careful scrutiny. However if its claims are valid it should not be ignored.

The key criticisms of FPTP are that is it can hand power to a party to form a government that does not have a majority of votes cast in its favour. It can even hand power to a party that does not have a plurality of votes. An election can be decided by a relatively small number of votes in a few marginal constituencies. There are safe seats where the party candidate can be assured of election, regardless of his/her personal characteristics or track record.

DPR Voting solves each of these FPTP problems

FPTP is defended because the single member constituency is well liked. It means that the relationship between the MP and the electorate is closer than in larger or multimember constituencies, or in party list systems. The constituency can coincide with a natural community.
In addition the simplicity of voting in an FPTP election makes it inclusive – voters are not excluded by a complex process. Similarly the counting process is simple and quick. Counting is easy to understand, and people feel that they understand the process, and trust it. The simpler the process the more likely fraud or error will come to light.

DPR Voting has these same FPTP advantages.

For electoral reformers, DPR Voting solves key FPTP problem areas.
For FPTP proponents, key features are retained.

In addition, from a purely practical point of view, the replacement of FPTP by DPR Voting would require less upheaval than would be the case with any other system. There is no need to change any constituency boundaries, and fewer boundary commissions would be required in future, so there would be cost savings compared to the change to any other electoral system.

The fact that it is untried does not mean that the potential advantages are not real.


Voting behaviour - Will voters use their votes to support one party to form the Government and the other vote to choose the best MP regardless of party, or are voters simply hardwired to vote for anything that wears their favourite party's colours?

This is an important point because a key advantage, that the system gets rid of safe seats, depends on voters being prepared to use their Representative vote to elect the best MP.

The Representative vote plays no part in choosing the party to form the Government or even the relative numbers of votes each party has in the parliament. It can only be used to elect the best MP. It is reasonable to expect that this point will require careful explanation, but unreasonable to assume that the explanation will not be grasped by the electorate.

A consequence of the two separate votes of DPR Voting is that a lazy, ineffective or dishonest MP cannot expect to be elected purely on the basis of the party's popularity. Similarly a well liked and hard working MP may retain his/her seat even if the MP's party takes a heavy defeat.
Party organisations will find it more difficult to parachute an outside candidate into a safe seat, and Party threats to an MP of de-selection will have less potency.
It also has implications for campaigns. Parties will need to campaign across all constituencies to win Party votes in the hope of being able to form the Government, but the Representative vote means that individual constituency elections have a strong local and individual dimension.

The limitations of FPTP are apparent when we consider how the electoral system deals with bad or dishonest MPs. At worst, people vote on the basis of party loyalty and the bad or dishonest MP is elected. Some voters are in a quandary and have to decide whether to vote for their party and implicitly lend support to a bad or dishonest MP, or whether to ignore the party of their choice and vote for another party. Alternatively they can abstain. In effect FPTP has no way of dealing with the problem. If the system protects bad or dishonest MPs, some will be elected. Conversely if the system encourages the election of MPs on the basis of ‘quality' – personal characteristics or track record, as DPR Voting does, the overall quality of MPs in the parliament will be improved.

In practice people may well vote for the party candidate if there is no local campaign and no charismatic candidate campaigning, but I can point to elections in the UK under FPTP where an outstanding candidate and campaign has made a big difference to the result. This has been true of a number of Lib Dem MPs in the UK . If the electorate will, on occasions, respond to an individual candidate with a strong campaign despite the FPTP system, then once the barrier to this voting approach is removed, it is reasonable to expect that people will use their Representative vote to elect the best candidate.

Putting the focus on the election of better MPs has one more important implication relevant to DPR Voting. Political Parties attract support across the electorate and from within this support each party will attract a proportion of members, and from the ranks of their members come their prospective election candidates.

Candidates are not of uniform quality. Some are better than others.

If the number of high quality candidates each party has is partly related to their overall level of popular support, and if the system introduces a tendency for high quality candidates to be elected, there will also be a tendency for parties who are currently under-represented in parliament under FPTP to get more candidates elected than they currently do.

I would expect this effect to be most apparent for the smallest parties, and the result could be that parties with small but significant support such as the Green Party and UKIP might have more constituency MPs elected when DPR Voting is employed, than under FPTP.


Are small parties disadvantaged? Is ‘ Automatic' Election democratically acceptable?

Under DPR Voting a small party needs at least one MP to exercise their vote in parliament. Small parties would be disadvantaged under DPR Voting if they failed to get a single constituency MP elected, as they are under FPTP. However there are two key differences that mean small parties will fare better under DPR Voting than they do under FPTP.

Firstly there is the change in the nature of the constituency election which puts the spotlight on the candidate, mentioned above. This raises the chances of high quality candidates being elected, regardless of party, and most small parties that have attracted any significant support will have an outstanding or charismatic candidate.

Secondly, in the event that a party fails to get a single constituency MP elected, but nevertheless achieves a level of support in the Party vote which exceeds a predetermined threshold (for example 1%), there is provision for the automatic election of a single MP (the party leader). Other electoral systems have established a precedent for a threshold level of votes to trigger party representation, notably in AMS (also known as MMP), although the process is different.

Arguably this breaches the claim that if DPR Voting is employed all MPs are constituency MPs.
This is true, but the implications are limited. Depending on the level at which the threshold is set, I would imagine it possible for one or two MPs (at most) to be elected by automatic election. They may not have a geographical constituency but each ‘automatic' MP would represent a constituency of the nationwide supporters of their party. AMS is in use where there are a considerable number of List MPs and I know this causes concerns. Two such MPs in a parliament of, say, 600 would not cause much of a practical problem.

Thus I accept the point in principal, but it is not a significant problem when weighed against the benefits of DPR Voting, and the comparable balance of advantages and disadvantages of FPTP and other well known electoral systems.

Can DPR Voting claim that no votes are wasted?

In DPR Voting you cast your Party vote for the party you support and this determines which party (or parties) form the Government.
You can vote for the party of choice whether or not there is a party candidate standing in the constituency. The Party votes are added up nationwide and then the percentage of votes of each party is used to determine the total number of votes each party has in the parliament.

This means that every vote makes a mathematical difference to the result of the election and determines the number of votes each party will have in the parliament regardless of where the vote is cast.

The mathematical consequence of percentages is that if one party gets one extra vote the percentage of the total vote for that party increases and the percentages for all the other parties is reduced. There are no longer any marginal constituencies, as there are in the FPTP system. Every vote in every constituency is equally important. Your vote makes a real difference to the party you vote for, and for many people this is the real purpose of going out to vote.

The plurality vote for the Representative does mean that the MP may be elected with a minority of votes. In fact you can argue a case for choosing the candidates by a plurality ie The best liked candidate as compared with the ‘least disliked candidate'. The key point is that the plurality vote has no effect on the number of votes the parties have in the parliament.
The constituency election is simply the local choice. A wasted vote in constituency election has limited consequences. It is harsh to say that you have wasted your vote, if it turns out you vote for a candidate that loses the election. You have still had an equal vote with everyone else in the election of the next Government, and your vote changes the number of votes the Government party or coalition will have in the parliament even if you vote for a party that ends up in opposition.


Will an under-represented party be under-represented on parliamentary committees?

The makeup of the parliament in terms of the numbers of the different party sponsored MPs depends on the results of the Representative vote. This makeup will probably differ from the party vote ratio. What effect will this have on the makeup of select committees? In the worst case the situation would be no worse than with the current FPTP, but arguably it would be better.
The extent to which a party may be under-represented will be reduced if the argument above related to voting behaviour and high quality candidates has an effect.

The Government party (or coalition) expects to have a majority on the committee. Select Committees have chairs who are elected by their fellow MPs for their particular skills or expertise, and MPs chosen to sit on the committee are expected to bring relevant expertise to the table. One change that could occur is that DPR Voting might make the select committee system less party political, which to some extent it already is. This is because it changes the relationship between MP and Party, in favour of the MP.


Would the different votes of MPs make close votes in the house too complicated for the party organisers to manage?

I think the party organisers would learn to manage these situations. It is true that it is no longer a matter of counting heads. Some multiplication is required, and in a fast changing situation a spreadsheet might be used. I suspect the politics would usually be much more complicated than the arithmetic.
Counting the votes after a parliamentary division would benefit from some form of electronic voting and counting. This might well have other benefits for parliamentary business. However the arithmetic is not so complex as to make an electronic form of voting essential.


To appear on the Party ballot paper DPR Voting suggests that all parties should ‘qualify' by some agreed means. If a party fails to qualify for inclusion on the ballot paper would this be a serious failing of the democratic credentials of the system?

At present under the FPTP system in the UK , candidates have to qualify in order to appear on the ballot paper (they gather 10 electors' signatures and pay a £500 deposit). In DPR Voting there is a separate Party ballot. It seems reasonable that a party should be required to demonstrate a minimum level of democratic support before it can appear on the ballot paper. The description of DPR Voting does not specify how easy or difficult this process of registration should be, whether the process should involve regional registration or simply nationwide registration. However from a practical point of view it would be an advantage if all the parties could be printed on a manageable sized ballot paper.
The UK system of political party registration has no requirement for a political party to demonstrate popular support, and there are over 400 parties currently registered. A ballot paper listing all the parties would be plainly impractical.
Canada also has a process for political party registration, with a requirement for 250 signatures, which might be suitable with or without modification. There are currently 18 political parties registered in Canada .
Regional registration, so that parties might appear on the ballot paper in the regions where they have most support, but not appear on the ballot paper in regions where they cannot demonstrate a minimum level of support, might be a practical advantage.

Is this acceptable from a Democratic standpoint? Provided the ability of a political party to qualify depends on demonstrating a specified level of popular support, and that this level is not prohibitive, I would argue that the democratic test has been passed. The candidate(s) of a party that cannot meet the qualification requirement can stand and be elected as Independent(s). Their supporters would not be disenfranchised.


Will any government willingly adopt a completely unknown and untried voting system?

Changing the voting system is not to be done lightly. It is unlikely that any government in the UK will bring forward proposals to change the voting system in the immediate aftermath of the AV referendum. Electoral reform will be a long haul. However, the nature of FPTP when used in a multi party democracy is that sooner rather than later there will be an election result which offends the democratic sensitivities of the people, their sense of fair play will be outraged. When that happens there will be renewed pressure for reform.

It would seem likely that any change will be decided by a referendum process. The recent AV referendum experience may suggest the way forward. The process could be divided into the component questions which are, broadly speaking –

Are we sufficiently dissatisfied with FPTP to look for an alternative, or not?
What is the alternative?
Which electoral system will the people choose – FPTP or the recommended alternative system?

This could require two referenda. The first referendum would be a decision, in principal, to drop FPTP (or not), subject to an alternative system being identified and approved. Then would follow a Citizens Assembly or similar process to find and recommend an alternative system. The second and final part of the referendum should be to accept the recommended system or alternatively to continue with FPTP.

MPs of all parties will have an important say in the debate, and any proposed changes will require parliamentary approval. The introduction of many PR electoral systems would require considerable upheaval and uncertainty for most MPs, who would face re-election under the new, unpredictable voting system, contesting a newly drawn, and perhaps completely different, constituency.

This is not the case with DPR Voting. Most MPs will be able to stand for re-election under basically the same electoral system as at present. An MP who is well liked and respected within the constituency should have a good chance of retaining their seat under DPR Voting.

Conclusion
DPR Voting is a form of Proportional Representation for multi party parliamentary democracies with single member constituencies that could replace FPTP. FPTP is a flawed voting system but has some attractive features. DPR Voting avoids the flaws but still retains the best features of FPTP. It would improve politics in the UK . It might also be relevant to the debate in Canada .

The introduction of DPR Voting would involve only the smallest change to our current electoral system. It would preserve the relationship between MPs and their constituents on the basis of a method of constituency election which is familiar. DPR Voting would achieve greater equality for the voter, greater voter choice, and a significant increase in proportionality at minimum cost and disruption. It could be simply and powerfully presented to the electorate as a fairer electoral system for Westminster .

DPR Voting could play an important part in the electoral reform debate. As a new system, it should get the proper scrutiny that it deserves.